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Abstract—This paper presents a novel Global Navigation 
Satellite System (GNSS) Avionics Based Integrity Augmentation 
(ABIA) system architecture suitable for civil and military air 
platforms, including Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). Taking the 
move from previous research on high-accuracy Differential GNSS 
(DGNSS) systems design, integration and experimental flight test 
activities conducted at the Italian Air Force Flight Test Centre (CSV-
RSV), our research focused on the development of a novel approach 
to the problem of GNSS ABIA for mission- and safety-critical air 
vehicle applications and for multi-sensor avionics architectures based 
on GNSS. Detailed mathematical models were developed to describe 
the main causes of GNSS signal outages and degradation in flight, 
namely: antenna obscuration, multipath, fading due to adverse 
geometry and Doppler shift. Adopting these models in association 
with suitable integrity thresholds and guidance algorithms, the ABIA 
system is able to generate integrity cautions (predictive flags) and 
warnings (reactive flags), as well as providing steering information to 
the pilot and electronic commands to the aircraft/UAS flight control 
systems. These features allow real-time avoidance of safety-critical 
flight conditions and fast recovery of the required navigation 
performance in case of GNSS data losses. In other words, this novel 
ABIA system addresses all three cornerstones of GNSS integrity 
augmentation in mission- and safety-critical applications: prediction 
(caution flags), reaction (warning flags) and correction (alternate 
flight path computation).  
 
Keywords—Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), 
Integrity Augmentation, Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Aircraft Based 
Augmentation, Avionics Based Integrity Augmentation, Safety-
Critical Applications. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE aerospace community has very stringent navigation 
integrity requirements, which apply to a variety of 
mission- and safety-critical operational tasks. Current and 
likely future air platforms are equipped with a variety of 
navigation sensors and systems. These sensors/systems can be 
used in a suitable integrated architecture to enhance integrity 
levels, therefore matching the requirements of mission/safety-
critical navigation and lading tasks both in military and civil 
aircraft. A novel and properly conceived technique providing 
Avionics Based Integrity Augmentation (ABIA) could have a 
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significant impact on the aerospace community, with the 
potential of being selected as a suitable technology for the 
future global Air Traffic Management (ATM) system, 
possibly within the framework of NextGen/SESAR 
developments (i.e., in association with other CNS/ATM 
technologies like ABS-B, RNAV and Aeronautical Data 
Links). In recent years, various strategies have been developed 
for increasing the levels of integrity of GNSS based 
navigation/landing systems. In addition to Space Based 
Augmentation Systems (SBAS) and Ground Based 
Augmentation Systems (GBAS), GNSS augmentation may 
also take the form of additional information being provided by 
other avionics systems. In most cases, the additional avionics 
systems operate via separate principles than the GNSS and, 
therefore, are not subject to the same sources of error or 
interference. A system such as this is referred to as an 
Avionics-Based or Aircraft-Based Augmentation System 
(ABAS). The additional sensors may include Inertial 
Navigation Systems (INS), VOR/DME, Radar, Electro-
Optical Sensors, Automated Celestial Navigation, Dead 
Reckoning, etc. Unlike SBAS and GBAS technology, 
published research on ABAS is limited and mainly 
concentrates on additional information being blended into the 
position calculation to increase accuracy and/or continuity of 
the integrated navigation solutions. Additionally, no 
significant attempts have been made of developing ABAS 
architectures capable of generating integrity signals suitable 
for safety-critical GNSS applications (e.g., aircraft precision 
approach and landing) and no commercial ABAS products are 
available at present. Although current and likely future 
SBAS/GBAS augmentation systems can provide significant 
improvement of GNSS navigation performance, a properly 
designed and flight certified ABAS system could play a key 
role in GNSS Integrity Augmentation for safety-critical 
applications such as aircraft precision approach and automatic 
landing. Furthermore, using suitable data link and data 
processing technologies on the ground, a certified ABAS 
capability could be a core element of a future GNSS Space-
Ground-Avionics Augmentation Network (SGAAN). 
II. DGNSS RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 
In recent years, the Italian Air Force Flight Test Centre was 
responsible for several flight test campaigns in which 
Differential GNSS (DGNSS) Time and Space Position 
Information (TSPI) systems were employed. These activities 
included [1]: 
1) MB-339CD DGPS In-flight Evaluation of Two Off-the-
shelf Receivers (Data Continuity); 
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 2) TORNADO-IDS DGPS Data Continuity and Accuracy 
Evaluation; 
3) EF-2000 (TYPHOON) DGPS Data Continuity, Accuracy 
and Integrity Evaluation.  
During the MB-339CD avionics flight trials, an in-flight 
evaluation of DGPS was carried out. The aim of this 
assessment was to compare the performance of various 
ASHTECH and TRIMBLE GPS receivers in a dynamic 
environment, in order to select the system with the best 
performance for employment in future activities. Particularly, 
the assessment focused on the data continuity provided by the 
two GPS receivers during execution of low, medium, and high 
dynamics maneuvers and re-acquisition times after GPS data 
losses. Analyzing several data from the MB-339CD DGPS test 
campaign and other flight test activities performed with DGPS 
instrumented aircraft (i.e., F104 ASA-M, AM-X, EF-2000, 
MB-339A, TORNADO-IDS, etc.), it was clear that the main 
disadvantage of the GPS is its vulnerability to signal losses 
caused by satellites masking and low SNR. Therefore, during 
some TORNADO-IDS flight trials these problems were 
thoroughly investigated, to test the capability of the on-board 
GPS receiver to reacquire satellite signals and to provide TSPI 
even with degraded satellite constellations. In order to assist in 
the investigation a simulation tool was used to evaluate the 
global masking effect due to antenna and aircraft body 
masking. A preliminary assessment was also carried out of 
Doppler effects influence on data quality. Moreover, 
appropriate procedures were defined for the optimal use of 
DGPS (continuous positioning data gathering with reduced 
satellite signal losses) in flight test activities with high 
performance aircraft. Finally, an assessment of DGPS data 
accuracy was carried out, by comparing the positioning data 
provided by DGPS with other known references (laser 
tracking, optical systems, etc.). The detailed results of these 
experimental case studies are reported in [1]. 
III. INTEGRITY AUGMENTATION 
GNSS augmentation benefits in the aviation domain can be 
summarized as follows: 
1) Increased Runway Access; 
2) More direct en route flight paths; 
3) New precision approach services; 
4) Reduced and simplified avionics equipment; 
5) Potential elimination of some ground-based navigation 
aids (VOR, ILS, etc.) with cost saving to Air Navigation 
Service Providers (ANSPs). 
Integrity relates to the level of trust that can be placed in the 
information provided by the navigation system [2]. It includes 
the ability of the navigation system to provide timely and valid 
warnings to users when the system must not be used for the 
intended operation or phase of flight. Specifically, a 
navigation system is required to deliver a warning (an alert) of 
any malfunction (as a result of a set alert limit being exceeded) 
to users within a given period of time (time-to-alert). Integrity 
risk also referred to as the probability of misleading 
information, is defined as the probability that the navigation 
positioning error exceeds the alert limit and that the event is 
not detected. Loss of integrity can happen in one of two ways. 
Either an unsafe condition is not detected or it is detected, but 
the alert is not received by the user within the time-to-alert. 
The alert limit defines the largest position error, which results 
in a safe operation. This is specified such that the error can 
degrade to a level larger than the 95th percentile accuracy 
requirement but still within a safe limit. Time-to-alert (TTA) 
is defined as the maximum time allowed from the moment a 
fault resulting in an unsafe condition is detected to the 
moment that the user is made aware of it. 
A. Avionics Based Integrity Augmentation 
The ABIA concept is very different from RAIM (Receiver 
Autonomous Integrity Monitoring), in which the aircraft 
characteristics (flight dynamics, body shape, antenna location, 
EMC/EMI) are not considered. Based on the results of the 
DGPS TSPI research activities, we designed an ABIA system 
specifically targeting GNSS integrity augmentation in TSPI 
applications (Fig. 1). In this ABIA system, the aircraft sensors 
provide information on the aircraft relevant flight parameters 
(navigation data, engine settings, etc.) to an Integrity Flag 
Generator (IFG), which is also connected to the on-board 
GNSS. The IFG can be incorporated into one of the existing 
airborne computers or can be a dedicated processing unit. 
Using the available data on GNSS and the aircraft flight 
parameters, integrity signals are generated which can be 
displayed on one of the cockpit displays and/or sent to an 
Aural Warning Generator (AWG). 
 
 
Fig. 1 ABIA system for flight test applications 
 
The next logical step is to extend the results obtained from 
modeling, simulation and flight test to the design of a 
complete GNSS ABIA system suitable for manned and 
unmanned aircraft applications. Such a system, would be able 
to provide steering information to the pilot (as the ABIA 
system for flight test applications) and, possibly, electronic 
commands to the aircraft/UAS Flight Control System (FCS), 
allowing for real-time and continuous integrity monitoring, 
avoidance of safety/mission-critical flight conditions and fast 
recovery of the Required Navigation Performance (RNP) in 
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2
 case of GNSS data degradation or loss. The architecture of this 
advanced ABIA system is depicted in Fig. 2. 
 
 
Fig. 2 ABIA evolution for manned and unmanned aircraft 
B. ABIA Integrity Flags and TTA Definitions 
The systems described above address both the predictive 
and reactive nature of GNSS integrity augmentation. To 
understand this concept, let us first of all introduce the 
definitions of alerts and TTA’s applicable to the ABIA 
system: 
1) Caution Integrity Flag (CIF)–This is a predictive 
annunciation that the GNSS data delivered to the avionics 
system is going to exceed the Required Navigation 
Performance (RNP) thresholds specified for the current 
and planned flight operational tasks (GNSS alert status).  
2) Warning Integrity Flag (WIF)–This is a reactive 
annunciation that the GNSS data delivered to the avionics 
system has exceeded the Required Navigation 
Performance (RNP) thresholds specified for the current 
flight operational task (GNSS fault status).  
3) Time-to-Caution (TTC)–This is the minimum time 
allowed for the caution flag to be provided to the user 
before the onset of a GNSS fault resulting in an unsafe 
condition.  
4) Time-to-Warning (TTW)–This is the maximum time 
allowed from the moment a GNSS fault resulting in an 
unsafe condition is detected to the moment that the ABIA 
system provides a warning flag to the user. 
IV. ABIA IFG MODULE DESIGN 
The main causes of GNSS positioning data degradation or 
loss at aircraft level are: 
1) Antenna obscuration; 
2) Bad satellite geometry (PDOP);  
3) Fading (low SNR);  
4) Doppler shift;  
5) Multipath effect (SNR, ranging and phase errors).  
Understanding the physics of these phenomena and 
developing suitable mathematical models is essential in order 
to properly design the ABIA IFG module. Fig. 3 shows the 
architecture of the simulator used to validate the IFG design 
for manned/unmanned platforms and to evaluate the TTA 
performance of the IFG (caution and warning flags) in various 
representative operational conditions. 
 
 
Fig. 3 IFG module simulation 
 
A GNSS constellation simulator (GCS) was implemented to 
support GNSS satellite visibility, signal and geometry 
analysis. Using CATIA-P3, a detailed aircraft (A/C) 3-
Dimensional Model (3DM) was developed and an Aircraft 
Dynamics Simulator (ADS) was implemented to generate the 
nominal flight path trajectory and attitude (Euler) angles. 
Terrain and Objects Data (TOD) is also required to run the 
MPS. Using a Digital Terrain Elevation Database (DTED), it 
is possible to obtain a detailed map of the terrain beneath the 
aircraft. Providing the aircraft trajectory inputs from the ADS 
module, terrain elevation data can be automatically extracted 
and fed to the TOM module where they are integrated with the 
database of man-made objects (e.g., buildings). The Doppler 
Simulator Module (DSM) calculates the Doppler shift by 
processing ADS and GCS inputs. The Multipath Analysis 
Module (MAM) process the 3DM, TEM, GCS and ADS 
inputs to determine multipath contributions from the aircraft 
(wings/fuselage) and from the terrain/objects close to the 
aircraft. The Obscuration Analysis Module (OAM) receives 
inputs from the 3DM, GCS and ADS, and computes the GNSS 
antenna (e) masking matrixes for all A/C maneuvers. The 
SNR Analysis Module (SAM) calculates the nominal link 
budget of the direct GNSS signals received by the aircraft in 
the presence of ionospheric and tropospheric propagation 
disturbances. The Integrity Flags Simulator (IFS) uses a set of 
predefined threshold parameters to trigger the generation of 
both caution and warning flags associated with antenna 
obscuration, Doppler shift, multipath, SNR, and satellite 
geometry degradations. The various modules implemented in 
the simulation and the techniques adopted to define the IFS 
integrity thresholds are described in the following paragraphs.  
A. GNSS Constellation Simulator 
The GNSS constellation simulator (GCS) was developed to 
calculate GNSS satellite position and velocity in the Earth-
Centered Earth-Fixed (ECEF) reference frame and to obtain 
satellite visibility data from any point along the aircraft flight 
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2
 trajectory. The initial version of the GCS was implemented in 
MATLAB to simulate GPS and GALILEO constellations. 
However, the GCS was developed as a flexible tool capable to 
incorporate other current and likely future GNSS 
constellations (GLONASS, COMPASS, etc.), including space-
based regional and global augmentation systems. With 
reference to Fig. 7, the GCS output is used by the MAM, 
OAM and SAM modules, as well as by the IFS. The satellite 
position and velocity are calculated from the Kepler's laws of 
orbital motion using the YUMA or SEM almanac data [3], [4]. 
B. Aircraft 3-D Model 
As an example, we consider the TORNADO aircraft. 
Various geometric parameters are required to draw a detailed 
CATIA (Computer Aided Three-dimensional Interactive 
Application) model of the aircraft. The main parameters are 
listed in Table I [5]. 
 
TABLE I 
TORNADO DIMENSIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Length 16.72 m (54 ft10 in) 
Wingspan 13.91 m at 25° wing sweep (45.6 ft)  
8.60 m at 67° wing sweep (28.2 ft) 
Height 5.95 m (19.5 ft) 
Wing area 26.6 m² (286 ft²) 
 
The TORNADO 3-D CATIA model is shown in Fig. 4. 
 
 
Fig. 4 TORNADO 3-D CATIA model 
 
When calculating the antenna masking matrix and the 
corresponding satellite visibility, the antenna location must be 
included in the model. Military aircraft typically have an 
upper antenna at the top of the fuselage and a lower antenna at 
the base of the fuselage. In our case, the upper antenna is 
assumed to be located 1.5m behind the cockpit along the 
aircraft centerline projection and 5cm high on the aircraft skin 
surface [1]. The lower antenna is assumed to be right below 
the upper antenna on the opposite side of the fuselage (Fig. 5). 
 
 
Fig. 5 TORNADO antennae locations 
 
When calculating the satellite visibility, the line of sight 
(LOS) is measured in the antenna frame (i.e., origin at the 
antenna focal point). The transformation from body-frame to 
antenna frame is obtained from: 
 F  F	
  T	
(m)               (1) 
 
The transformation matrixes for the upper and lower 
antennae are: 
 
T	
  0.8800.74 m              (2) 
 
 T	
  0.8802.13  m                  (3) 
C. Flight Dynamics Simulator 
The Flight Dynamics Simulator (FDS) uses a 3 Degrees of 
Freedom (3-DOF) model with variable mass to calculate the 
trajectory of the aircraft (i.e., position, velocity and attitude 
angles) during the different flight phases. The assumption 
adopted in this model is: 
1) The earth shape is approximated as an ellipsoid using 
WGS-84 parameters.  
2) The atmosphere is considered at rest relatively to the earth 
and a standard ISA atmospheric model is adopted 
defining temperature, pressure and density as a function 
of altitude. 
3) The aircraft is modeled as a rigid body with a vertical 
plane of symmetry. 
4) The mass of the aircraft in flight varies (decreases) only 
due to fuel consumption. 
5) Forces acting on the centre of gravity of the airplane are 
the thrust, aerodynamic forces and the weight. 
6) The flight is supposed to be symmetric (no sideslip). 
The 3-DOF scalar equations are the following: 
 ! "#"$  %&'()  *+, -, .  !/(012          (4) 
 
25° wing sweep 
67° wing sweep 
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 !+ "3"$  %(01)  .&'(4  !/&'(2            (5) 
 !+ "5"$  %(01)  . 6789:; 3               (6) 
 "<"$  &+, -%                   (7) 
 "="$  #>?63:; 5@ABC                    (8) 
 "θ"$  #>?63;D 5:;=@EBC                   (9) 
 "F"$  +(012                   (10) 
 
where: ! = Aircraft mass; + = Aerodynamic speed; % = Thrust magnitude; ) =  Angle of attack; - =  Altitude; . =  Lift magnitude; * =  Drag, defined as a function of+, -and .; / =  Gravity acceleration; 2 =  Flight path angle; 4 =  Bank or roll angle; G =  Heading angle; &  =  Specific fuel consumption (a function of+and -); 
Φ =  Geodetic latitude; 
θ =  Geodetic longitude; HI =  Meridional radius of curvature; HJ =  Transverse radius of curvature. 
This model presents seven state variables 
(+, G, 2, !, K, L, - and three control variables (%, ., 4. 
Hence, for it to be solved, at least three flight constraints must 
be specified for each flight maneuver.  
D. Satellite Masking Analysis 
Due to the maneuvers of the aircraft, the wings, tail and 
fuselage will obscure some satellites during the flight. Fig. 6 
shows the structure of the Satellite Masking Analysis (SMA) 
module. Taking into account the aircraft shape (CATIA 3-D 
model), the A/C flight dynamics (pitch, roll and yaw 
variations) and the information provided by the GCS, anglobal 
Antenna Masking Matrix (AMM) is generated for the different 
flight maneuvers possible. An example of the resulting Global 
Antenna Masking Matrix (AMM) obtained taking into account 
both bank (B) and pitch (P) angle variations is shown in Fig. 
7. Besides the AMM, other factors influence the satellite 
visibility. In general, a satellite is geometrically visible to the 
GNSS receiver only if its elevation in the antenna frame is 
above the Earth horizon and the antenna elevation mask.  
 
 
Satellite Visibility
(BODY)
LOS                                 
(ENU)
LOS                              
(BODY)
LOS                               
(ECEF)
User Position              
(ECEF)
Satellite Position 
(ECEF)
Earth Blocking
(ECEF)
A/C Flight 
Dynamic Model
Antenna Masking
(BODY)
A/C 3D Model
(CATIA)
 
Fig. 6 GNSS satellite obscuration simulator 
 
It should be noted that even high performance avionics 
GNSS antennas have a gain patterns that is typically below -
3dB at about 5 degrees elevation [6] and, as a consequence, 
their performance become marginal below this limit. 
 
 
 
Fig. 7 Global Masking Envelope 
 
In order to determine if a satellite is obscured, the LOS of 
the satellite with respect to the antenna phase centre has to be 
determined. To calculate the satellite azimuth and elevation 
with respect to the antenna the transformation matrix between 
ECEF (Earth Centered Earth Fixed) and the antenna frame 
must be applied. This transformation is obtained as follows: 
 TM  T N TO N TMO                (11) 
 
where T is the transformation matrix between the aircraft 
body frame and the antenna frame, TO is the transformation 
matrix from ENU (East-North-Up) to body frame, and TMO is 
the ECEF to ENU transformation matrix. As an example, Fig. 
8 shows the trajectory of a TORNADO aircraft during a 
turning descent maneuver lasting 300 seconds (spiral flight 
with a constant turn radius) and Fig. 9 shows the combined 
GPS/GALILEO satellite visibility during the same flight 
phase.  
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Fig. 8 TORNADO turning descent maneuver 
 
The number of satellites in view varies from 7 to 16 during 
this flight maneuver. 
 
 
Fig. 9 Satellite Visibility (TORNADO TDP) 
E. Link Budget Analysis (Multipath Free) 
The SNR at the receiver is affected by a number of factors. 
These factors include both transmitter and receiver 
characteristics, as well as propagation losses and interferences. 
In our simulation, the SNR Analysis Module (SAM) combines 
the various factors contributing to the GNSS signal fading. 
Multipath induced effects are considered separately. The SAM 
module takes inputs from the GCS and FDS modules, and 
computes SNR. In practice, the ratio of total carrier power to 
noise C/NQ in dB-Hz is the most generic representation of 
received signal strength. This is given by: 
 ROS  P  GV  GW  SL  LZ  L[  σ]  N^dB    (12) 
 
where: 
P  =  Transmitted power GV =  Satellite antenna gain GW =  Receiver antenna gain 
SL = Free Space Loss  LZ =  Atmospheric attenuation (dry-air) L[ =  Rainfall attenuation σ] = Tropospheric fading N^ =  Receiver noise figure 
Considering the bandwidth of the filter in the receiver (Bn), 
the GNSS link budget can be calculated from [6]: 
SNRdB  bO  ROS dB  Hz  BdB              (13) 
 
The link budget calculated from (13) only refers to the 
direct GNSS signal received from a satellite. Multipath 
effects, which are due to the geometric and reflective 
characteristics of the environment surrounding the GNSS 
antenna are not included in this calculation and are discussed 
separately. The L-band antenna onboard GPS satellites are 
designed to radiate the composite L-band signals to the users 
on and near the Earth. As shown in Fig. 10, the GPS satellite 
viewing angle from edge-to-edge of Earth is about 27.7 
degrees [7]. The satellite antenna is designed to illuminate the 
Earth’s surface with an almost uniform signal strength. The 
path loss of the signal is a function of the distance from the 
antenna phase centre to the surface of the Earth. The path loss 
is minimum when the satellite is directly overhead (satellite at 
90 degrees elevation), and is maximum at the edge of the 
coverage area (satellite at the horizon). 
 
 
Fig. 10 GPS Satellite Antenna Coverage 
 
The difference in signal strength caused by this variation in 
path length is about 2.1 dB. The GPS satellite antenna gain 
can be approximated by [7]: 
 GVdB  2.5413 N sinE  2.5413                 (14) 
 
where E is the angle between the satellite zenith and the 
receiver (radians). The GPS receiver antenna shall accept the 
GPS navigation signals at both the L1 and L2 frequencies and 
output them to the GPS antenna electronics. The gain patterns 
of the TORNADO antennas, having -3dB gain at 10° elevation 
and 3.5dB at 90° elevation (Fig. 11) is approximated by: 
 GWdB  7.8659 N sinE  4.3659              (15) 
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Fig. 11 TORNADO antenna gain pattern 
 
GNSS signal frequencies (L-band) are sufficiently high to 
keep the ionospheric delay effects relatively small. On the 
other hand, they are not so high as to suffer severe propagation 
losses even in rainy conditions. However, the atmosphere 
causes small but nonnegligible effects that must be taken into 
account. The major effects that the atmosphere has on GNSS 
signals include [6]: 
1) Ionospheric group delay/carrier phase advance;  
2) Tropospheric group delay; 
3) Ionospheric scintillation; 
4) Tropospheric attenuation; 
5) Tropospheric scintillation. 
The first two effects have a significant impact on GNSS 
data accuracy but do not directly affect the received signal 
strength (C/N0). Ionospheric scintillation is due to 
irregularities in the electron density of the Earth’s ionosphere 
(scale size from hundreds of meters to kilometers), producing 
a variety of local diffraction and refraction effects. These 
effects cause short-term signal fading, which can severely 
stress the tracking capabilities of a GNSS receiver. Signal 
enhancements can also occur, but the GNSS user cannot make 
use of the brief periods of stronger signal in any useful 
manner. On the contrary, fading can be so severe that the 
signal level will drop below the receiver tracking threshold 
and, as a consequence, the signal must be re-acquired. 
Atmospheric scintillation effects are more significant in the 
equatorial and sub-equatorial regions and tend to be less of a 
factor at European and North-American latitudes. 
Unfortunately, at the moment, there is little to nothing we can 
do to estimate ionospheric scintillation effects and no efficient 
predictive algorithms are available for integration in the ABIA 
system. As a consequence the CIF functionality is not 
implemented for ionospheric fading and only a WIF approach 
is adopted (i.e., severe ionospheric scintillation causing loss of 
lock to the satellites). Tropospheric attenuation in the 1-2 GHz 
frequency band is dominated by oxygen, but even this effect is 
normally quite small [6]. The effects of water vapor, rain, and 
nitrogen attenuation in the GNSS frequency bands can be 
neglected for most applications [3]. The oxygen attenuation 
A(E) is on the order of 0.035dB for a satellite at zenith and 
varies with the elevation angle (E) in proportion to the 
tropospheric path length L (obliquity factor or mapping 
function). If the troposphere is modeled by a simple uniform 
spherical shell of height h], the oxygen attenuation A(E) can 
be approximated by [6]: 
 
AE n [opqrspZBtrs;DMB√;DrMB[Br  v
[owQ 	x;D MBQ.Qyz dB    for 3 ~  ~ 10 /owQ	x;D M dB    for E  10 /  (16) 
 
where: a =  h] R⁄  h] =  Oxygen equivalent height (h]  6km) R  = Earth radius (R n 6378km)  
Equation (37) provides acceptable results only if E>3 
degrees. However, since several other errors affects 
measurements from satellites with elevation below 5 degrees, 
a software mask is typically employed in avionics GNSS 
receivers to exclude these satellites form the navigation 
computations [1]. Tropospheric rainfall attenuation is of little 
importance in the GNSS frequency bands. For instance, at a 
frequency of 2 GHz the attenuation even for high rainfall rates 
(i.e., rates grater then 100 mm/h), is less than 0.01 dB/km. 
Rainfall attenuation below 2 GHz is even less. Tropospheric 
scintillation is caused by irregularities (primarily atmospheric 
turbulence) causing variations of the refractive index, mainly 
in the first few kilometres above the ground. Tropospheric 
scintillation effects vary with time and are dependent upon 
frequency and elevation angle. At GNSS frequencies, these 
effects are generally relatively small. The CCIR provided an 
expression for the long-term mean value of scintillation 
intensityσ. For small omnidirectional antennas, such as 
typical GNSS antennas, the CCIR expression for the long-term 
rms amplitude scintillation varies with frequency and 
elevation angle as follows [7]: 
 σ]  0.025f rcsc EQ.dB            (17) 
 
where f is the frequency in GHz. For L1=1.57542GHz we 
have: 
 σ]  0.0326csc EQ.dB            (18) 
 
Thus, for low elevation angles and small fractions of time, 
tropospheric scintillation can be significant, but otherwise it is 
quite small. The Noise Figure (in dB) is related to the system 
noise temperature (TSys) in Kelvin as follows [6]: 
 NF  10logZQ1  VVS               (19) 
 
where TQ = 290K = 24.6 dB-K. The corresponding noise 
density, in W/Hz, is: 
 NQ  KTb
;                  (20) 
 
where K -228.6dBW/K-Hz (or 1.380 10[zW/K-Hz), is 
the Boltzmann constant. The system noise temperature 
(antenna plus receiver) is computed using the Friisformula [8], 
[9]. Typical noise figures for state-of-the-art GPS receivers are 
between 2 and 4 dB. As an example of the overall SNR 
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 computation, Fig. 12 shows the received SNR (signal 
transmitted from PRN-14) during the TORNADO turning 
descent maneuver. 
 
 
Fig. 12 PRN-14 SNR during turning descent 
F. Multipath Analysis 
Multipath is caused by the interference of multiple 
reflections (from the ground and the aircraft structure) with the 
direct signal transmitted by the satellite and represents a major 
source of error in the GNSS observations. The level and 
characteristics of the multipath effect depend on the geometry 
of the environment surrounding the antenna, the reflectivity of 
nearby objects/terrain and the satellite elevation angle. In 
order to builda reliable multipath model, a combination of 
SNR analysis (comparison with the direct GNSS signal) and 
geometric ray-tracing methods is adopted. In our case, we use 
the aircraft 3D CATIA model to identify the geometric 
characteristics of the multipath signal and study the SNR 
variations associated with multipath. 
 
 
Fig. 13 Phase of GNSS signal 
 
From Fig. 13, the SNR and phase error for a single refection 
can be represented as a function of direct and multipath signal 
amplitudes and the multipath relative phase β[10]: 
 SNR  A:[  A	[  A][  2A	A]cosβ        (21) 
 tanδ=  o;DoBo:;                  (22) 
 
where A	 is the amplitude of the direct signal, A] is the 
amplitude of the multipath signal andβ is the phase of the 
multipath.  
 
 
Fig. 14 Variation of Ac as function of the angle β 
 
Fig. 14 shows that both the multipath phase βand the 
multipath signal amplitude affect the received signal. 
Therefore, we required a multipath model to simulate these 
two factors, considering the reflections from the aircraft 
surfaces (wings and fuselage) and from the ground. In our 
research, we adopted the Aeronautical Multipath Channel 
model developed during the ESA-SDS research [11]. Fig. 15 
illustrates the structure of the multipath channel model. Let 
h(t,τ) be the impulse response of the multipath channel model. 
Then h(t,τ) is given by [10]: 
 ht, τ  1  ∑  PDzD¡Z N nDt N δt  τD               (23) 
 
where PD is the Echo Power of the ith path. The signal nDt is a 
noise signal with Power i, and a power spectral density Nf[10]: 
 
Nf  ¢ 01/B0
f ~ ¤/2B/2 ~ ¥ ~ ¤/2 f  ¤/2                             (24) 
 
where B is the noise bandwidth. From the multipath channel 
model in Fig. 15, the wing reflection, the fuselage reflection 
and the ground echo are the main components of the multipath 
signal. Fig. 16 shows the geometric reflection model. The 
incoming wave is considered to be located T, a receiver at 
location R, and the reflection point at S. Location V is a 
defined point on the reflecting surface and n stands for a unit 
vector normal to the surface. 
 
 
Fig. 15 Multipath channel model 
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 Fig. 16 Geometric reflection model
  
In geometric ray-tracing theory, the reflection point S and 
the defined point V should satisfy the equation:
 S  V  n  0           
 
And the line equation connecting T and 
 S  T  t  RD]x  T       
 
where t is a parameter between 0 and 1. 
(26): 
 S  T  §VW¨t©ªV RD]x  T    
 
The corresponding extra path length,L
reflection, is then: 
 L]b  |T  S|  |R  S|  |T  R|    
 
In the TORNADO wing reflection model, the wing is 
assumed to be flat. By Gaussian Doppler Spectrum theory, the 
power of the wing echo spectrum is assumed to be [10
 
P¬	  20 N logZQ ­ Z [®¯r N e ±rr²r³   
 
where the deviation σ=3.8Hz. The wing reflection signal delay 
can be calculated from: 
  τDxt  [N´N;D MRS          
 
where L is the antenna height from the wing, 
angle and CQ is the speed of light. In the ESA
reflection model the fuselage is assumed to be a cylinder.
power of the fuselage echo spectrum is given by
 P:dB  20 N logZQk  b[ N e·N|¸| 
 
where b[ and bz are fuselage geometric coefficients described 
in [10], [11] and the constant k is given by:
 k  SNR  mean ¹dBº        
 
 
 
 
      (25) 
RD]x: 
      (26) 
Combining (25) and 
      (27) 
]b, due to specular 
      (28) 
], [12]: 
      (29) 
         (30) 
E is the elevation 
-SDS fuselage 
 The 
: 
      (31) 
 
      (32) 
ESA-SDS research [11] results 
reflection characteristics change very little by increasing the 
fuselage radius. For easier implementation of the fuselage 
reflection model, a 2-dimensional polynomial function of 4th 
order was fitted to each parameter (mean, b
of TORNADO's upper antenn
the fuselage at a height of 
reflection extra path is very short and the time delayτ¸;x  1.7  10ZQs. Ground reflection becomes 
important only during the landing phase, when the aircraft is 
in close proximity of the terrain. Like before, assuming a 
Gauss distributed ground reflection amplitude with zero mean,
the ground echo power is given by [12]:
 
P¬	  20 N logZQ ­ Z [®¯r N
 
where, in this case, the deviation 
airport/terrain is flat: 
 τx	t  [NFN;D MRS    
 
where h is the aircraft altitude and E is the elevation angle.
Obviously, this basic ground 
take into account various terrain geometries. As an example, 
Fig. 17 shows the ground echo signal time delay during a 
TORNADO turning descent 
simulation time is 300s. 
 
Fig. 17 Ground echo time delay
As discussed in [6], GPS receivers can effectively reject 
most of the multipath signal if the differential 1.5 µs for the C/A code and 0.15
consequence, the region of potential multipath delay problems 
for the C/A code is: 
 h N sinE ~ 1.5 µs N CQ 
 
Simulation results showed that the fuselage reflection is the 
main contribution to multipath. The effects of reflected signals 
from the wings and from the ground are comparatively small.
showed that the fuselage 
2, b3). In the case 
a, since the antenna is located on L¸;x=0.05m, the fuselage 
 
 
 
e ±rr²r³         (33) 
σ=3.8Hz. Assuming that the 
           (34) 
 
echo model can be expanded to 
maneuver over flat terrain. The 
 
 
 
delay ∆τ 
µs for the P(Y) code. As a 
448.5 m        (35) 
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 G. Doppler Shift Analysis  
 Doppler shift is the change in frequency of the received 
signal that is experienced when the observer (aircraft) moves 
relative to the signal source (satellite). The Doppler shift 
caused by satellite/aircraft relative motion is given by: 
 ∆f  p½¨½¾: s  f  cosα             (36) 
 
where: ∆f = nth satellite signal frequency shift; vD = satellite velocity; v = aircraft velocity; 
c  = speed of light(3108 ms-1); 
f  = GPS frequency; α = angle between the aircraft velocity and the nth satellite 
LOS vector. 
Examples of the Doppler shift experienced by the signal 
received from a particular satellite (PRN-5) during straight-
and-level flight and during turning-descent maneuvers are 
shown in Figs. 18 and 19. 
 
 
Fig. 18 Doppler Shift (straight and level) 
 
 
Fig. 19 Doppler Shift (turning descent) 
H. Integrity Flag Criteria 
The philosophy adopted to set-up thresholds for the ABIA 
CIF and WIF integrity flags is depicted in Fig. 20.  
 
CIF and WIF 
Thresholds
Relative 
Geometry 
Radio 
Frequency
Receiver 
Tracking
Antenna Masking
Position Accuracy 
PLL Tracking
FLL Tracking
Masking Matrixes
Estimated HPE/VPE
Rx Tracking Errors
DLL Tracking
Multipath
Link Budget
Interference
C/N0 Calculation
J/S Calculation
Doppler Shift
Phase/Range Errors
Frequency Error
 
 
Fig. 20 Integrity flag thresholds 
 
The masking integrity flag criteria are the following: 
1) When the current aircraft maneuver will lead to less the 4 
satellite in view, the CIF shall be generated. 
2) When less than 4 satellites are in view, the WIF shall be 
generated. 
Additionally, if only four satellites are in view: 
3) When one (or more) satellite(s) elevation angle (antenna 
frame) is less than 10 degrees, the caution integrity flag 
shall be generated. 
4) When one (or more) satellite(s) elevation angle is less 
than 5 degrees, the warning integrity flag shall be 
generated. 
From the definition of Dilution of Precision (DOP) factors, 
GNSS accuracy can be expressed by [13]: 
 σÁ  DOP  σÄMWM                   (37) 
 
where σÁ is the standard deviation of the positioning accuracy 
and σÄMWM is the standard deviation of the satellite 
pseudorange measurement error. For the C/A-code σÄMWMis in 
the order of 33.3m. Therefore, the 1-sigma Estimated Position, 
Horizontal and Vertical Errors of a GNSS receiver can be 
calculated using the PDOP (EPE in 3D), the HDOP (EHE in 
2D) or the VDOP (EVE). In order to generate CIFs and WIFs 
that are consistent with current GNSS Required Navigation 
Performance (RNP), we need to introduce the Horizontal and 
Vertical Accuracy (HA/VA) requirements in the various flight 
phases. Table II shows the GNSS signal-in-space alert 
requirements in terms of HA/VA for En-route, Non-precision 
Approach (NPA) and for the three categories of Precision 
Approach. Table III shows the GNSS signal-in-space 
protection requirements [14], [15]. The Horizontal Alert Limit 
(HAL) is the radius of a circle in the horizontal plane, with its 
centre being at the true position, which describes the region 
which is required to contain the indicated horizontal position 
with the required probability for a particular navigation mode. 
Similarly, the Vertical Alert Limit (VAL) is half the length of 
a segment on the vertical axis, with its centre being at the true 
position, which describes the region which is required to 
contain the indicated vertical position with the required 
probability for a particular navigation mode. 
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 TABLE II 
SIGNAL-IN-SPACE ALERT REQUIREMENTS 
Typical operation 
Accuracy horizontal 
95% 
Accuracy vertical 
95% 
En-route 3.7 km N/A 
En-route Terminal 0.74km N/A 
NPA 220m N/A 
APV-I 16m 20m 
APV-II 16m 8m 
Category-I prec. 
approach 
16m 6m-4m 
Category-II prec. 
approach 
6.9m 2m 
Category-III prec. 
approach 
6.2m 2m 
 
Based on our discussion, the DOP integrity flags criteria 
are: 
1) When the EHE exceeds the HA 95% or the VA 95% alert 
requirements, the CIF shall be generated. 
2) When the EHE exceeds the HAL or the EVE exceeds the 
VAL, the WIF shall be generated. 
 
TABLE III 
SIGNAL-IN-SPACE PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS 
Typical operation 
Horizontal 
Alert Limit 
Vertical Alert 
Limit 
TTA 
En-route 7.4 km N/A 5min 
En-route continental 3.7km N/A 15s 
En-route terminal 1.85 km N/A 10s 
NPA 556m N/A 10s 
APV-I 40m 50m 6s 
APV-II 40m 20m 6s 
Category-I prec. 
approach 
40m 15m-10m 6s 
Category-II prec. 
approach 
17.3m 5.3m 1s 
Category-III prec. 
approach 
15.5m 5.3m 1s 
 
During the landing phase, a GNSS Landing System (GLS) 
has to be augmented by GBAS in order to achieve the RNP, as 
well as Lateral and Vertical Protection Levels (LPL and VPL). 
LPL/VPL is defined as the statistical error value that bounds 
the Lateral/Vertical Navigation System Error (NSE) with a 
specified level of confidence. In particular, for the case of 
LAAS, which allows for multiple DGPS reference receivers 
(up to four) to be implemented, two different hypotheses are 
made regarding the presence of errors in the measurements: 
1) H0 Hypothesis – No faults are present in the range 
measurements (includes both the signal and the receiver 
measurements) used in the ground station to compute the 
differential corrections; 
2) H1 Hypothesis – A fault is present in one or more range 
measurements and is caused by one of the reference 
receivers used in the ground station.   
Consequently, LPL and VPL are computed as follows: 
   LPL  MAX Ç.È.ÉQ , .È.ÉZÊ (38) 
 VPL  MAX Ç+È.ÉQ, +È.ÉZÊ (39) 
VPL and LPL for the H0and H1 hypotheses are calculated as 
described in [16]. The lateral and vertical accuracy (NSE 
95%) and alert limits required by a GLS in the presence of 
LAAS, considering the continuously varying position of the 
aircraft with respect to the Landing Threshold Point (LTP) are 
given in [16]. Additionally, [16] provides the so-called 
Continuity of Protection Levels in terms of Predicted Lateral 
and Vertical Protection Levels (PLPL and PVPL). Although 
the definition in [16] is quite comprehensive, a generic 
statement is made that the PVPL and PLPL computations shall 
be based on the ranging sources expected to be available for 
the duration of the approach. In other terms, it is implied that 
the airborne subsystem shall determine which ranging sources 
are expected to be available, including the ground subsystem’s 
declaration of satellite differential correction availability 
(satellite setting information). Unfortunately, this generic 
definition does not address the various conditions for satellite 
signal losses associated to specific aircraft maneuvers 
(including curved GLS precision approaches). Therefore, it is 
suggested that an extended definition of PLPL and PVPL is 
developed taking into account the continuously varying 
aircraft-satellite relative geometry (masking envelope). In 
particular, when the current aircraft manoeuvre will lead to 
less than 4 satellites in view or unacceptable accuracy 
degradations, the CIF shall be generated. Following our 
discussion, the additional integrity flags criteria adopted for 
GLS in the presence of LAAS are the following: 
1) When the PLPL exceeds LAL or PVPL exceeds the VAL, 
the CIF shall be generated. 
2) When the LPL exceeds the LAL or the VPL exceeds the 
VAL, the WIF shall be generated. 
Multipath integrity flags were defined using the Early-Late 
Phase (ELP) observable and the range error. In a GPS receiver 
having three correlators (early, prompt and late), the phase of 
a correlator is given by [16]: 
 ΦRt  tanZ pÌÍÎÍ s               (40) 
 
where the subscript C can refer to early (E), prompt (P) and 
late (L) respectively. The prompt phase is always kept close to 
zero by the carrier tracking loop. Early and late correlators are 
then placed on each side of the prompt, which means one of 
the phase of the correlator is positive and the other is negative. 
So, the phase difference between the two is increased in the 
presence of multipath. ELP is simply the phase difference 
between the early and late correlator outputs, where the phase 
of a correlator output is equal to the inverse tangent of the Q 
channel output divided by the I channel output. 
Mathematically, ELP is calculated by [16]: 
 ELPt  tanZ ÏÌÐÎÐ  ÌÑÎÑ Ò           (41) 
 
The probability of multipath detection is approximately 
80% by setting the ELP threshold 0.1 rad (Fig. 21).  
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Fig. 21 Probability of detecting multipath for varying threshold on 
ELP value (α = Am/Ad) [17], [18] 
 
Additionally, as shown in Fig. 21, with an ELP threshold of 
0.1 radians, the probability of false alarm is 0.3 when C/NQ is 
42 dB/Hz. 
 
 
Fig. 22 Probability of false alarm for multipath detection for varying 
threshold on ELP value [17], [18] 
 
As a result of our analysis, the multipath integrity flags 
criteria are the following: 
1) When the ELP exceeds 0.1 radians, the caution integrity 
flag shall be generated. 
2) When the multipath range error exceeds 1 meter, the 
warning integrity flag shall be generated. 
The possibility of setting additional thresholds based on the 
multipath phase error is currently being investigated. In order 
to define the integrity thresholds associated with Doppler and 
Fading effects, a dedicated analysis of the GNSS receiver 
tracking performance was required. When the GNSS 
measurement errors exceed certain thresholds, the receiver 
loses lock to the satellites. Since both the code and carrier 
tracking loops are nonlinear, especially near the threshold 
regions, only Monte Carlo simulations of the GNSS receiver 
in different dynamics and SNR conditions can determine the 
receiver tracking performance [13], [18]. Nevertheless, some 
conservative rule of thumbs that approximate the measurement 
errors of the GNSS tracking loops can be used. Numerous 
sources of measurement errors affect the Phase Lock Loop 
(PLL) and the Frequency Lock Loop (FLL). However, for our 
purposes, it is sufficient to analyze the dominant error sources 
in each type of tracking loop. Considering a typical GNSS 
receivers employing a two-quadrant arctangent discriminator, 
the PLL threshold is given by [13]: 
 3σÁ´´  3σÓ  θ Õ 45°              (42) 
 
where: σÓ = 1-sigma phase jitter from all sources except dynamic 
stress error θ = dynamic stress error in the PLL tracking loop 
Expanding (42), the 1-sigma threshold for the PLL tracking 
loop becomes [13]: 
 σÁ´´   σÁ´´[  σ×[  θo[  Øªz Õ 15°        (43) 
 
where: σÁ´´ = 1-sigma thermal noise; σ× = vibration-induced oscillator phase noise; θo = Allan variance–induced oscillator jitter. 
The PLL thermal noise is often thought to be the only 
carrier tracking error, since the other sources of PLL jitter may 
be either transient or negligible. The PLL thermal noise jitter 
is computed as follows: 
 
σÁ´´  zÙQ[π Ú ÛR/OS 1  Z[VR/OSdegrees       (44) 
 
where: B = carrier loop noise bandwidth (Hz); C/NQ = carrier to noise power ratio (dB-Hz); 
T  =  predetection integration time (seconds); Band C/NQ can be derived from the SNR model described 
before. Determination of the vibration-induced oscillator 
phase noise is a complex analysis problem. In some cases, the 
expected vibration environment is so severe that the reference 
oscillatormust be mounted using vibration isolators in order 
for the GPS receiver to successfully operate in PLL. The 
equation for vibration induced oscillator jitter is: 
 
σ×  zÙQ¸Ð[® ÚÜ S×[f] Á¸¸r df]¸tÝ¸¨Û  degrees        (45) 
 
where: f´ =  L-band frequency (Hz); S×f] = oscillator vibration sensitivity of ∆f/f´ per g as a 
function of fm; f] =  random vibration modulation frequency (Hz); Pf] = power curve of the random vibration as a function 
of f]g[/Hz; 
g  = gravity acceleration.  
Usually the oscillator vibration sensitivity, S×f] is not 
variable over the range of the random vibration modulation 
frequency, then (45) can be simplified to:  
 
σ×  zÙQ¸ÐbÞ[® ÚÜ Á¸¸r df]¸tÝ¸¨Û  degrees           (46) 
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 In the TORNADO simulation, we assume the random 
vibration power curve to be flat from 20Hz to 2000Hz with an 
amplitude of 0.005g[/Hz and the oscillator vibration 
sensitivity S×f]  1  10w parts/g. The equations used to 
determine Allan deviation phase noise are empirical. They are 
stated in terms of what the requirements are for the short-term 
stability of the reference oscillator as determined by the Allan 
variance method of stability measurement. The equation for 
second-order loop short-term Allan deviation is: 
 θo[  144 ¯ßàN¸ÐÛ  rad                (47) 
 
The equation for third–order loop short-term Allan 
deviation for PLL is [13]: 
 θoz  160 ¯ßàN¸ÐÛ  rad             (48) 
 
where: σoτ = Allan deviation-induced jitter (degrees); f´ =  L-band input frequency (Hz); τ = short-term stability gate time for Allan variance 
measurement (seconds); B = noise bandwidth. 
Usually σoτcan be determined for the oscillator and it 
changes very little with gate time τ. In our research, the loop 
filter is assumed as a third-order with a noise bandwidth B=18Hz and the gate timeτ  1/B  56ms.The Allan 
deviation is specified to be σoτ  10ZQ. The dynamic 
stress error depends on the loop bandwidth and order. In a 
third-order loop, the dynamic stress error is given by the 
following equation: 
 
θz  	·W/	·áS·  0.4828
·âã·Û·  degrees        (49) 
 
where: d[R/dt[ = maximum LOS acceleration dynamics (°/s[); B = noise bandwidth. 
Considering the TORNADO GPS receiver characteristics, a 
third-order loop noise bandwidth is 18Hz and the maximum 
LOS jerk dynamic stress is 10g/s=98m/sz[14].For the L1 
frequency we have: dzR/dtz  98/sz  360°/cycle 1575.42  10Ù cycles/s/c  185398°/sz. 
Frequency jitter due to thermal noise and dynamic stress 
error are the main errors in a GNSS receiver FLL. The 
receiver tracking threshold is such that the 3-sigma jitter must 
not exceed one-fourth of the frequency pull-in range of the 
FLL discriminator. Therefore, the FLL tracking threshold is 
[13]: 
 3σ^´´  3σ^´´  f Õ 1/4T  Hz         (50) 
 
where: 
3σ^´´ =  3-sigma thermal noise frequency jitter σ^´´ =  dynamic stress error in the FLL tracking loop 
Equation (50) shows that the dynamic stress frequency error 
is a 3-sigma effect and is additive to the thermal noise 
frequency jitter. The reference oscillator vibration and Allan 
deviation–induced frequency jitter are small-order effects on 
the FLL and are considered negligible. The 1-sigma frequency 
jitter threshold is 1/(12T) = 0.0833/T Hz. The FLL tracking 
loop jitter due to thermal noise is: 
 
σ^´´  Z[®V Úy^ÛR/OS Ï1  ZVR/OSÒ Hz         (51) 
 
where F is 1 at high C/NQ and 2 near the threshold. σ^´´is 
independent of C/A or P(Y) code modulation and loop order. 
Since the FLL tracking loop involves one more integrator that 
the PLL tracking loop of the same order [14], the dynamic 
stress error is: 
 f  		 p ZzÙQáSÛ 	ÛW	Û s  ZzÙQáSÛ 	ÛåW	Ûå   Hz        (52) 
 
Regarding the code tracking loop, a conservative rule-of-
thumb for the Delay Lock Loop (DLL) tracking threshold is 
that the 3-sigma value of the jitter due to all sources of loop 
stress must not exceed the correlator spacing (d), expressed in 
chips. Therefore [4], [13]: 
 3σæ´´  3σæ´´  R Õ d  chips         (53) 
 
where: σæ´´ = 1-sigma thermal noise code tracking jitter; 
Re = dynamic stress error in the DLL. 
The DLL thermal noise code tracking jitter is given by: 
 
σæ´´  Úy^	rÛ:/S Ï21  d  y^r	V:/SÒ Hz          (54) 
 
where: FZ = DLL discriminator correlator factor (1 for time shared 
tau-dithered early/late correlator and 0.5 for dedicated 
early and late correlators); 
d = Correlator spacing between early, prompt and late;  
Bn = Code loop noise bandwidth; 
F2 = DLL dicriminator type factor (1 for early/late type 
discriminator and 0.5 for dot product type 
discriminator). 
The DLL tracking loop dynamic stress error is given by: 
 
R  âÛãÛáSÛ chips                       (55) 
 
where dR/ dt is expressed in chips/secn.   
The PLL, FLL and DLL error models (conservative rule-of-
thumb equations) described above allow to determine the C/NQ corresponding to the tracking threshold of the receiver.  
A generic criteria applicable to the ABIA system is:    
 pROQsVF;F	  max épROQsÁ´´ , pROQs^´´ , pROQsæ´´ê            (56)    
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 where: C/NQÁ´´ Minimum C/NQ for PLL tracking; C/NQ^´´ Minimum C/NQ for FLL tracking; C/NQæ´´ Minimum C/NQ for DLL tracking. 
Numerical solutions of (42), (50) and (53) show that the 
weak link in unaided avionics GNSS receivers is the carrier 
tracking loop threshold (greater sensitivity to dynamics stress). 
Therefore, the C/NQÁ´´ threshold can be adopted in these 
cases. In general, when the PLL loop order is made higher, 
there is an improvement in dynamic stress performance. 
Therefore, third order PLL are widely adopted in avionics 
GNSS receivers. Assuming 15 to 18 Hz noise bandwidth and 5 
to 20 msec predetection integration time (typical values for 
avionics receivers), the rule-of-thumb tracking threshold for 
the PLL gives 25 to 28 dB-Hz. Additionally, in aided avionics 
receiver applications, the PLL tracking threshold can be 
significantly reduced by using external velocity aiding in the 
carrier tracking loop. With this provision, a tracking threshold 
of approximately 15 to 18 dB-Hz can be achieved. Using these 
theoretical and experimental threshold values, we can also 
calculate the receiver Jamming-to-Signal (J/S) performance 
for the various cases of practical interest, as described in [19]. 
When available, Monte Carlo simulation and flight test data 
collected in representative portions of the aircraft operational 
flight envelope shall be used. Taking an additional 5% margin 
on the 3-sigma tracking thresholds for the CIF, the following 
additional criteria are introduced: 
1) When either 42.25° Õ 3σÁ´´ Õ 45° or 0.2375T Õ3σ^´´ Õ 0.25T or 0.05d Õ 3σæ´´ Õ d, the CIF shall be 
generated. 
2) When either 3σÁ´´  45°or 3σ^´´  1/4% or 3σæ´´  the WIF shall be generated. 
In avionics receiver, lock detectors are used to assess if the 
satellite signals are being tracked or not tracked. Code lock 
detection is very similar to estimating the received C/NQ, 
inferring that the receiver is operating on or near the 
correlation peak. Knowledge of code lock is obviously parallel 
to the knowledge of received signal power. The receiver’s 
code-correlation process has to raise the signal out of the 
noise. The spread spectrum processing gain (G) is defined as 
the ratio of the spread bandwidth to the unspread (baseband) 
bandwidth and is expressed in dB. The post-correlation signal-
to-noise ratio can be calculated by [12]: 
 S/N;:.  S/N:.  G        (57) 
 
When the receiver code is aligned with the transmitted 
code, the signal power at the bandpass output is crushed into 
approximately 100 Hz of bandwidth. The processing gain can 
be calculated from: 
 GÁ  10 log p[RâVí s  dB              (58) 
 
where CR is the chipping rate and TD is the data period. For the 
C/A-code this works out to be about 43dB. The TORNADO-
IDS receiver has a cut off value at 10dB, which means that if 
the value is less than this the satellite signal level is too low to 
be used in the positioning computations [12]. Therefore, an 
additional threshold to be accounted for is: 
 S/N;:.  S/N:.  G≥10 dB            (80) 
 
During the GPS-TSPI flight test activities performed on 
TORNADO-IDS with unaided L1 C/A code avionics 
receivers, it was also found that, in all dynamics conditions 
explored, a C/NQof 25 dB-Hz was sufficient to keep tracking 
of the satellites [15]. Consequently, taking a 2 dB margin for 
the CIF, the following additional criteria are adopted for the 
TORNADO S/N integrity flags: 
1) When the C/NQis less than 27dB-Hz or the difference 
between the S/N and the processing gain is less than 12 
dB, the CIF shall be generated.  
2) When the C/NQis less than 25dB-Hz or the difference 
between the S/N and the processing gain is less than 10 
dB, the WIF shall be generated.  
V. SIMULATION 
In order to validate the design validate the ABIA IFG 
module, a MATALAB simulation was performed employing 
the algorithms developed during this research. The simulated 
TORNADO aircraft trajectory included the following phases: 
1) Climb flight phase (0-5min); 
2) Cruise flight phase (5-10min); 
3) Turn and descend flight phase (10-5min); 
4) Cruise flight phase (15-20min); 
5) Straight descent flight phase (20-25min). 
In this simulation, the cruise phases corresponded to 
straight-and-level flight segments. During the simulation, 
three cases of satellite constellation were considered:  
1) GPS only; 
2) GALILEO only; 
3) Combined GPS/GALILEO.  
All CIFs and WIFs relative to antenna masking, geometric 
accuracy degradations, SNR, multipath and Doppler shift were 
generated. The main results obtained with the simulated GPS 
constellation are shown in Table IV. 
 
TABLE IV 
TORNADO INTEGRITY FLAGS 
Phase Climb Cruise 
Turn & 
Descent 
Cruise Appr. 
Duration 5min 5min 5min 5min 5min 
Satellites 
in view 
PRN 1, 3, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 22, 23, 26, 27, 30, 31 
CIF - - 
600~608s 
 
672~ 698s 
 
762~788s 
 
852~878s 
- 1484~1500s 
WIF - - 
674~692s 
 
764~782s 
 
854~872s 
- 1490~1500s 
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 Table V shows the specific CIFs and WIFs generated 
during the various TORNADO flight phases. There was only 
one case (flight slice 600-608s) where the CIF was generated 
not being followed by the WIF (this was due to a temporary 
adverse relative geometry during the turning descent 
maneuvers). In all other cases, the CIF was followed by the 
WIF. It was also observed that the CIF was always triggered at 
least 2 seconds before the successive WIF onset (up to 6 
seconds during the straight descent phase). These results 
contribute to corroborate the validity of the models developed 
for the CIF/WIF thresholds. It was also observed that the CIF 
was always triggered at least 2 seconds before the successive 
WIF onset. This evidence is particularly important for the 
ABIA system design. In fact, it is evident that the availability 
of a usable CIF represents a significant progress in this 
research with the potential for both manned aircraft and UAS's 
to recover from mission- and safety-critical flight conditions 
potentially leading to GNSS data losses. Therefore, it is 
envisaged that a properly designed ABIA FPM could take full 
advantage of this predictive behavior, allowing the aircraft to 
correct its flight trajectory/attitude in order to avoid the 
occurrence of the critical GNSS data losses. Additionally, it is 
possible that this predictive behavior be exploited in the 
pursuit of a GNSS based auto-landing capability.   
 
TABLE V 
CIF AND WIF IN VARIOUS FLIGHT PHASES 
Phase Climb Cruise Turn & Descent Cruise Approach 
Duration 5min 5min 5min 5min 5min 
Masking CIF 
0~300s 
PRN 30 
300~600s 
PRN 30 
PRN 3, 6, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 22, 23, 26 
900~1200s 
PRN 30 
1200~1500s 
PRN 30 
Masking WIF - - 
PRN 3, 6, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 22, 23, 26 
- 
PRN 30 
1210~1236s 
1254~1500s 
SNR CIF 
0~300s 
PRN  1, 3, 9, 11, 12, 
13, 30 
300~600s 
PRN  1, 3, 9, 11, 12, 
13, 30 
600~900s 
PRN. 1, 3, 12, 13, 30 
900~1200s 
PRN.1, 3, 9, 11, 12, 
13, 30 
1200~1500s 
PRN. 1, 3, 9, 11, 12, 13, 30 
SNR WIF 
0~300s 
PRN. 1, 3, 11, 12, 13, 
30 
0~50s 
PRN.9 
300~600s 
PRN. 1, 3, 11, 12, 13, 
30 
600~900s 
PRN. 1, 3, 12, 13, 30 
900~1200s 
PRN.1, 3, 11, 12, 13, 
30 
1200~1500s 
PRN  1, 3, 11, 12, 13, 30 
Multipath CIF 
0~300s 
PRN  1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 30 
300~600s 
PRN  1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 
30 
600~900s 
PRN  1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 30 
900~1200s 
PRN 1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 12, 
13, 
30 
1200~1500s 
PRN  1, 3, 11, 12, 13, 30 
Multipath  WIF 
0~300s 
PRN  1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 30 
300~600s 
PRN  1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 
30 
600~900s 
PRN  1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 30 
900~1200s 
PRN  1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 
30 
1200~1500s 
PRN  1, 3, 11, 12, 13, 30 
Doppler CIF 
0~300s 
PRN  1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 
30 
300~600s 
PRN  1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 
30 
600~900s 
PRN  1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 30 
900~1200s 
PRN  1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 
30 
1200~1500s 
PRN  1, 3, 11, 12, 13, 30 
Doppler WIF 
0~300s 
PRN  1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 30 
300~600s 
PRN  1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 30 
600~900s 
PRN  1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 30 
900~1200s 
PRN  1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 30 
1200~1500s 
PRN  1, 3, 11, 12, 13, 30 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The architecture of a novel ABIA system for mission- and 
safety-critical GNSS applications was presented. The detailed 
design of the ABIA IFG module was also accomplished. This 
module can generate both CIFs and WIFs associated to 
antenna obscuration, geometric accuracy degradations, SNR, 
multipath and Doppler shift. A simulation of the IFG module 
was performed in MATLAB. Relevant flight maneuvers were 
considered in this simulation, including climb, cruise, turning 
descent and straight descent. From the results of this 
simulation activity, the following conclusions are drawn: 
1) The initial design of an Avionics Based Integrity 
Augmentation (ABIA) system for GNSS applications was 
accomplished. 
2) The ABIA Integrity Flag Generator (IFG) is capable of 
generating integrity flag to provide both caution 
(predictive) and warning signals to the pilot when GNSS 
signals are degraded or lost. 
3) According to the simulation results, after the CIF is 
generated, the time available for the pilot/autopilot to 
react (before the WIF is generated), is sufficient for 
safety-critical tasks including GLS curved/segmented 
precision approach and automatic landing applications. 
4) Preliminary data analysis shows that the ABIA system 
can provide the TTA required for CAT-IIIC precision 
approach, which is currently unavailable with GBAS. 
Further research is currently focusing on the following key 
areas [20]-[23]:  
1) Improve the aircraft dynamics model and develop a 
Maneuver Identification Algorithm (MIA) suitable for 
incorporation in the ABIA Flight Path Guidance (FPG) 
module. 
2) Examine other types of manned aircraft (e.g., civil 
airliners) and UAS, as well as unconventional body 
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 shapes (e.g., blended wing body aircraft). 
3) Perform additional research on multipath detection and 
isolation in various kinds of receiver for avionics 
applications. 
4) Develop and test the ABIA Flight Path Guidance (FPG) 
modules for manned A/C and UAS.  
The long-term objectives of this research comprise an in-
depth evaluation of the ABAS/ABIA techniques potential to 
improve integrity levels in a wide spectrum of civil/military 
mission-critical and safety-critical GNSS applications. In 
particular, future research will address the following topics: 
1) Investigating and comparing different types of avionics 
sensor technologies and their potential to support the 
design of a robust ABAS/ABIA architecture in small UA 
applications [24]-[29]. 
2) Evaluating the potential of ABAS/ABIA techniques to 
supplement current and likely future SBAS/GBAS 
technology for en-route, terminal, approach and surface 
aircraft/UAS operations. 
3) Investigating the potential of ABAS/ABIA to support a 
UAS Sense-and-Avoid (SAA) capability [30]. 
4) Investigating the potential of ABAS/ABIA to enhance the 
performance of Flight Management Systems (FMS) for 
manned and unmanned aerospace vehicles [31]-[33]. 
5) Investigating the potential of ABAS/ABIA architectures 
to support ATM Intent Based Operations (IBO) in a four-
dimensional trajectory (4DT) optimization environment 
[34]-[38]. 
REFERENCES 
[1] Sabatini, R., and G. B. Palmerini, “Differential Global Positioning 
System (DGPS) for Flight Testing”, NATO Research and Technology 
Organization (RTO), Systems Concepts and Integration Panel (SCI), 
AGARDograph Series RTO-AG-160, Vol. 21, Oct 2008. 
[2] Ochieng W.Y., Sauer, K., Walsh, D., Brodin, G., Griﬃn, S., and 
Denney, M., “GPS Integrity and Potential Impact on Aviation Safety". 
The Journal of Navigation (Royal Institute of Navigation), Vol. 56, pp. 
51–65. 2003. 
[3] CelesTrak (CSSI) YUMA GPS Almanacs. Available online at: 
http://www.celestrak.com/GPS/almanac/Yuma/definition.asp (accessed 
in July 2012). 
[4] CelesTrak (CSSI) SEM GPS Almanacs. Available online 
at:http://www.celestrak.com/GPS/almanac/SEM/definition.asp (accessed 
in July 2012). 
[5] Anonymous, “Aircraft Drawings,” available online at: 
http://www.aircraftdrawindsdownload.com (accessed in July 2012). 
[6] Spilker, J. J., Global Positioning System: Theory and Applications, Vol. 
1, American Institute of aeronautics and Astronautics publication, Inc., 
Reston, 1996. 
[7] Gustavsson, P., “Development of a Matlab-based GPS-constellation 
simulation for navigation algorithm developments,” MSc Thesis, Lulea 
University of Technology, 2005. 
[8] Davenport, W. B., and Root, W.L., An Introduction to the Theory of 
Random Signals and Noise, IEEE Press, New York, 1987. 
[9] Friis, H. T., "Noise Figures in Radio Receivers," Proceedings of the IRE, 
Vol. 32, July 1944, pp. 419-422. 
[10] Steingass, A., “The High Resolution Aeronautical Multipath Navigation 
Channel,” German Aerospace Center DLR, 2004. Available at 
http://www.kn-s.dlr.de/satnav. 
[11] A. Steinggass, A. Lehner, “Aeronautical Channel Model”. German 
Aerospace Center DLR. 2004. Available online at http://www.kn-
s.dlr.de/satnav (accessed in July 2012). 
[12] Braasch, M. S., “On the characterization of multipath errors in satellite-
based precision approach and landing systems,” MSc Thesis, College of 
Engineering and Technology, Ohio University, June 1992. 
[13] Kaplan, E. D., Hegarty, C. J., Understanding GPS: Principles and 
Applications, Second Edition, Artech House, Boston and London, 2006.  
[14] ICAO - Annex 10 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 
Aeronautical Telecommunications Volume 1: Radio Navigation Aids,  
Edition 6, July 2006. 
[15] CAA Safety Regulation Group Paper 2003/09, GPS Integrity and 
Potential Impact on Aviation Safety. 2003. 
[16] RTCA DO-245A, Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards 
for Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS), Dec 2004. 
[17] Mubarak O. M., Dempster, A. G., “Analysis of early late phase in single 
and dual frequency GPS receivers for multipath detection,” University of 
New South Wales (Australia). 2010. Available online at: 
http://www.gmat.unsw.edu.au/snap/staff/omer_mubarak.htm (accessed 
in July 2012). 
[18] Mubarak, O. M., Dempster, A. G., “Statistical analysis of early late 
phase for multipath detection,” IGNSS Symposium 2009, Gold Coast, 
Australia, December 2009. 
[19] Ward, P, “Using a GPS Receiver Monte Carlo Simulator to Predict RF 
Interference Performance,” Proceedings of the 10th International 
Technical Meeting of The Satellite Division of The Institute of 
Navigation, Kansas City, MO, September 1997, pp.1473–1482. 
[20] R. Sabatini, T. Moore, C. Hill. “A New Avionics Based GNSS Integrity 
Augmentation System: Part 2 – Integrity Flags.” Journal of Navigation 
(Royal Institute of Navigation), Vol. 66, No. 4, pp. 511-522. DOI: 
10.1017/S0373463313000143. June 2013.  
[21] R. Sabatini, T. Moore and C. Hill. “A New Avionics Based GNSS 
Integrity Augmentation System: Part 1 – Fundamentals.” Journal of 
Navigation (Royal Institute of Navigation). Vol. 66, No. 3, pp. 363-383. 
DOI: 10.1017/S0373463313000027. May 2013. 
[22] R. Sabatini, T. Moore and C. Hill. “Avionics Based GNSS Integrity 
Augmentation for Mission- and Safety-Critical Applications.” 25th 
International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of the Institute 
of Navigation: ION GNSS-2012. Nashville (Tennessee), September 
2012. 
[23] R. Sabatini, T. Moore and C. Hill. “A Novel Avionics Based GNSS 
Integrity Augmentation System for Manned and Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles.” Paper presented at the European Navigation Conference 2012 
(ENC 2012). Gdansk (Poland), April 2012. 
[24] R. Sabatini, S. Ramasamy, A. Gardi and L. Rodriguez Salazar, “Low-
cost Sensors Data Fusion for Small Size Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
Navigation and Guidance.”International Journal of Unmanned Systems 
Engineering, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 16-47. DOI: 10.14323/ijuseng.2013.11. 
August 2013. 
[25] R. Sabatini, M.A. Richardson, C. Bartel, A. Kaharkar, T. Shaid, L. 
Rodriguez and A. Gardi, “A Low-cost Vision Based Navigation System 
for Small Size Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Applications.” Journal of 
Aeronautics and Aerospace Engineering, Vol. 2, No. 
3.DOI: 10.4172/2168-9792.1000110. May 2013. 
[26] R. Sabatini, L. Rodríguez, A. Kaharkar, C. Bartel and T. Shaid, "Carrier-
phase GNSS Attitude Determination and Control for Small UAV 
Applications.” Journal of Aeronautics and Aerospace Engineering, Vol. 
2, No. 4.DOI: 10.4172/2168-9792.1000120. July 2013. 
[27] R. Sabatini, C. Bartel, A. Kaharkar, T. Shaid, D. Zammit-Mangion and 
H. Jia. “Vision Based Sensors and Multisensor Systems for Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles Navigation and Guidance.” Paper presented at the 
European Navigation Conference 2012 (ENC 2012). Gdansk (Poland), 
April 2012. 
[28] R. Sabatini, L. Rodríguez, A. Kaharkar, C. Bartel and T. Shaid. 
“Satellite Navigation Data Processing for Attitude Determination and 
Control of Unmanned Air Vehicles.” European Navigation Conference 
2012, Paper presented at the European Navigation Conference 2012 
(ENC 2012). Gdansk (Poland), April 2012. 
[29] R. Sabatini, C. Bartel, A. Kaharkar, T. Shaid, H. Jia, and D. Zammit-
Mangion.“Design and Integration of Vision-based Navigation Sensors 
for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Navigation and Guidance.”SPIE 
Photonics Europe 2012 Conference. Brussels (Belgium), March 2012. 
[30] L. Rodriguez Salazar, R. Sabatini, S. Ramasamy and A. Gardi.“A Novel 
System for Non-Cooperative UAV Sense-And-Avoid.”European 
Navigation Conference 2013 (ENC 2013). Vienna (Austria), April 2013. 
[31] S. Ramasamy, R. Sabatini, A. Gardi, Y. Liu, “Novel Flight Management 
System for Real-Time 4-Dimensional Trajectory Based Operations.” 
AIAA GNC 2013 Conference. London (USA). Boston, Massachusetts 
(USA), August 2013. 
[32] M. Sangam, R. Sabatini, S. Ramasamy and A. Gardi, “Advanced Flight 
Management System for an Unmanned Reusable Space Vehicle.” 
World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology
International Journal of Geomatics and Civil Engineering
 Vol:7, No:12, 2013 
2562International Scholarly and Scientific Research & Innovation 7(12) 2013 scholar.waset.org/1307-6892/9996882
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l S
ci
en
ce
 In
de
x,
 G
eo
m
at
ic
s a
nd
 C
iv
il 
En
gi
ne
er
in
g 
V
ol
:7
, N
o:
12
, 2
01
3 
w
as
et
.o
rg
/P
ub
lic
at
io
n/
99
96
88
2
 International Journal of Unmanned Systems Engineering, Vol. 1, No. 3, 
pp. 48-68. DOI: 10.14323/ijuseng.2013.12. August 2013. 
[33] S. Ramasamy, R. Sabatini, Y. Liu, A. Gardi, L. Rodriguez Salazar. “A 
Novel Flight Management System for SESAR Intent Based 
Operations.”European Navigation Conference 2013 (ENC 2013). Vienna 
(Austria), April 2013. 
[34] A. Gardi, R. Sabatini, S. Ramasamy, K. de Ridder, “4-Dimensional 
Trajectory Negotiation and Validation System for the Next Generation 
Air Traffic Management.”AIAA GNC 2013 Conference. Boston, 
Massachusetts (USA), August 2013. 
[35] A. Gardi, R. Sabatini, K. De Ridder, S. Ramasamy. L. Rodriguez 
Salazar. “Automated Intent Negotiation and Validation System for 4-
Dimensional Trajectory Based Operations.” European Navigation 
Conference 2013 (ENC 2013). Vienna (Austria), April 2013. 
[36] K. Chircop, D. Zammit-Mangion, R. Sabatini.“Bi-Objective 
Pseudospectral Optimal Control Techniques for Aircraft Trajectory 
Optimisation." 28th International Congress of the Aeronautical Sciences: 
ICAS-2012. Brisbane (Australia), September 2012. 
[37] W. Camilleri, K. Chircop, D. Zammit-Mangion, R. Sabatini, V. Sethi, 
“Design and Validation of a Detailed Aircraft Performance Model for 
Trajectory Optimization.” Paper presented at the AIAA MST 
Conference 2012. Minneapolis, Minnesota (USA), August 2012. 
[38] W. Gu, R. Navaratne, D. Quaglia, Y. Yu., K. Chircop, I. Madani, H. Jia, 
V. Sethi, R. Sabatini, D. Zammit-Mangion, “Towards the Development 
of a Multi-disciplinary Flight Trajectory Optimization Tool — 
GATAC.” ASME Turbo Expo 2012 Conference. Copenhagen 
(Denmark), June 2012. 
World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology
International Journal of Geomatics and Civil Engineering
 Vol:7, No:12, 2013 
2563International Scholarly and Scientific Research & Innovation 7(12) 2013 scholar.waset.org/1307-6892/9996882
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l S
ci
en
ce
 In
de
x,
 G
eo
m
at
ic
s a
nd
 C
iv
il 
En
gi
ne
er
in
g 
V
ol
:7
, N
o:
12
, 2
01
3 
w
as
et
.o
rg
/P
ub
lic
at
io
n/
99
96
88
2
